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SOUTH KOREAN ECONOMY AND THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH CHINA 
 
CELAL BAYARI 
 
THE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY 
ABSTRACT 
South Korea has had a continuous engagement with significant trade, investment and security matters 
simultaneously in its relations with other nations.1  South Korea’s bilateralism with China is a part of a 
larger milieu which China has been constructing, that includes the Belt and Road Initiative2 (BRI) and the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).  South Korea has become a member of the AIIB in December 
2015 and it has not joined the BRI.  The discussion here also concerns South Korea-China FTA agreement’s 
aftermath.  China is a nation with a very broad range of regional, intraregional and global ambitions and 
strategies.3  Undoubtedly, the East Asian security framework has an overbearing impact on the trade and 
investment environment.4  Moreover, the relations between Seoul and Pyongyang are relevant to the 
economic and political developments in East Asia.5  There are earlier discussions of the structure of the 
US-South Korea and China-North Korea alliances6  and there is also prior coverage of the effects of China 
on North Korean economy and the consequences for South Korea, neither of which will not be recapped 
here due to lack of space.7  South Korea, together with the US, Japan, North Korea, China and Russia, has 
been engaged in a long process of negotiations in several ‘six party talks’8 since 2003, to bring  a lasting 
peace to the Korean Peninsula, which have not, as yet, led to a final outcome, as has been the case with the 
series of the US and North Korean disarmament talks that originated in 1994.  While these issues are 
relevant to the larger context of the topic, in this discussion, the focus is on the South Korean economic 
model and business systems9 and its interaction with the Chinese economy and the 2015 FTA and the 
Chinese business systems.   
Keywords: South Korean economy, Chaebols, China, FTA, Belt and Road Initiative, global value chains  
 
SOUTH KOREAN BUSINESS SYSTEMS 
The state and chaebols are the two primary factors that have integrated South Korea into the global 
economy.10  National economic survival strategies of the South Korean state culminated in a new viable 
developmental model in East Asia.11  In the neoliberal globalisation phase of the global economy too, the 
South Korean state maintained its guidance of the national economy and the chaebols.12  The South Korean 
business systems are specific to the conditions and the time they have originated from which makes them 
arguably hard to replicate elsewhere.13  The discussion below will first investigate, in stages, the elements 
of the South Korean business systems.  From the 1960s onward, the South Korean state assisted business 
formations, provided ‘how-to’ blueprints and supplied finance for targeted investments and industries that 
 
1 Yul Sohn (2019) ‘South Korea under the United States–China rivalry’.  The Pacific Review.  32(6): 1019-1040. 
2 Seong-hyon Lee (2018) ‘The Shift of Security Environment in Northeast Asia’.  Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament.  1(2): 352-362. 
3 Celal Bayari (2018) ‘Economy and Market in China’.  Academy of Taiwan Business Management Review.  14(1): 13-36.  
4 Kiyoung Chang and Choongkoo Lee (2018) ‘North Korea and the East Asian Security order’.  The Pacific Review.  31(2): 245-255. 
5 Christina Kim Chilcote (2018) ‘Bridges of Ambition to North Korea’.  Critical Sociology.  44(3) 437-453. 
Muhui Zhang (2018a) ‘Institutional Creation or Sovereign Extension’.  International Relations of the Asia-Pacific.  18: 249-278. 
6 Stephen Blank (2018) ‘Korean Denuclearization in the context of earlier Proliferation and Disarmament negotiations’.  The Journal of East 
Asian Affairs.  32(2): 1-58. 
Audrye Wong (2020) ‘Managing Small Allies Amidst Patron-Adversary Rapprochement’.  Asian Security.  16(1): 107-126. 
7 Balbina Y. Hwang (2019) ‘Northeast Asian Perspectives on China’s Belt Road Initiative’.  East Asia.  36:129–150. 
Seung-Ho Jung and Byung-Yeon Kim (2018) ‘Trade Between North Korea and China’.  Emerging Markets Finance and Trade.  54(7): 1475-1489. 
Tat Yan Kong (2018) ‘China’s engagement-oriented strategy towards North Korea’.  The Pacific Review.  31 (1): 76-95. 
8 Seong-hyon Lee (2018) ‘The Shift of Security Environment in Northeast Asia’.  Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament.  1(2): 352-362. 
Anthony V. Rinna (2018)  ‘Russia's Strategic Partnerships with China and South Korea’. 
Asia Policy.  13(3): 79-99. 
9 The term ‘business systems’, for the purposes of this discussion, signifies the different clusters or levels of business entities [i.e. state-owned-
enterprises, private enterprises, public utilities, etc.] in a hierarchy that is determined by a corresponding share of GDP, with each cluster 
having a specifically defining membership (see Conceptual Models 1 and 2 below). 
10 Kyung Mi Kim and Hyeong-Ki Kwon (2017) ‘The State’s Role in Globalization’.  Politics & Society.  45(4): 505–531. 
11 You-il Lee and Kyung Tae Lee (2015) ‘Economic Nationalism and Globalization in South Korea’. Asian Perspective. 39: 125-151. 
12 Hyeong-ki Kwon and Kyung Mi Kim (2018) ‘Varieties of globalisation and national economy’.  Journal of International Development.  1-27. 
13 Eun Mee Kim, Pil Ho Kim and Jinkyung Kim (2013) ‘From development to development cooperation’.  The Pacific Review.  26(3): 313-336. 
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culminated in the present chaebols-led economy that characterises South Korea.14  Throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s, in order to develop strategic industries, the South Korean state created ‘quasi state-owned-
enterprises’ that matured into chaebols, nationalized the banking sector, and provided foreign lenders with 
guarantees for loans to chaebols.15  This is a point of difference from the situation in China where the state 
developed state-owned- enterprises and has continued to maintain some of them as such and the ones that 
became privatised cannot really be classified as private capitalist enterprises.  The symbiotic relationship 
between the South Korean state and the chaebols has had a varying balance of power from the start and 
throughout the Park Chung Hee government, whence they established their monopolistic positions across 
all industries as the domestic economy that had not yet sufficiently developed markets.16   
 
Table 1: Chaebols value-added share (%) of GDP  
Top 46 chaebols combined: 43% [1978 data]17  
Top 20 chaebols combined: 13.5%.   [1994 data]18 
Top 4 chaebols combined: 30% [1997 data]19 
Top 30 chaebol combined: 30% [2000 data]20  
Top 5 chaebol combined: 48.6% [2010 data]21  
Top 10 chaebol combined: 80% [2012 data]22  
 
 
Conceptual Model 123: South Korean business systems24  
 
 
14 Seok Hyeon Choi and Pan Suk Kim (2015) ‘Failure and success in South Korea and Taiwan.  Philippine Political Science Journal. 36(1): 19-34. 
15 Phillip Wonhyuk Lim (2001) ‘The Evolution of Korea’s Development Paradigm’. ADB Institute Working Paper 21. 
16 Seung-Rok Park and Ky-hyang Yuhn (2012) ‘Has the Korean chaebol model succeeded’.  Journal of Economic Studies.  39(2): 260-274. 
Tan Aik Seng (2017) ‘The Changing Arena of Power Contestation Between the State and Chaebols in South Korea.  Cornell International Affairs 
Review.  11(1). 
17 Jae-Jin Yang (2017) The Political Economy of the Small Welfare State in South Korea.  Cambridge: CUP. 
18 Makoto Abe and Momoko Kawakami (1997) ‘A Distributive Comparison of Enterprise Size in Korea and Taiwan’.  The Developing Economies.  
35(4): 382-400 
19 Jae-Jin Yang (2017) The Political Economy of the Small Welfare State in South Korea.  Cambridge: CUP. 
20 Chuk Kyo Kim (2019) Economic Development of Korea.  Singapore: WSP. 
21 Keunsoo Kim (2013) ‘Chaebols and Their Effect on Economic Growth in South Korea’.  Korean Social Sciences Review.  3(2): 1-28. 
22 Kwon Eun-jung (2012) ‘Top ten chaebol now almost 80% of Korean economy’.  Available at <http://.english.hani.co.kr>.  Accessed 16 March 
2020. 
23 The author’s conceptualization 
24 Samsung Group, Hyundai Motor Group, SK Group, LG  are the largest four as per Chae Yun-Hwan (2019) ‘FTC names 59 chaebol to 2019 
watch list’.  Korea Joong Ang Daily.  15 May.  Forbes Global 2000 (2019) provides a ranking of individual companies,  not the chaebols. 
System 1: Largest Chaebols
System 2: Other Chaebols
System 3: Small and Medium 
Enterprises
System 4: State owned and state-
share holding enterprises including 
utility companies
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Chaebols, with their subsidiary firms, have come to define South Korean economy as a result of their high 
levels of ownership in the economy, their role in the rapid industrialisation, exports, overseas expansion, as  
the result of which the state-chaebols relationship has developed from more of control to one of 
coordination.25  However, chaebols still do benefit from extensive political and legal patronage.26  The 
classical chaebol models display complex circular chain ownership structures frequently within a family-
centric holding company or simply circular shareholdings by several firms, but among the smaller chaebols, 
a range of mutual funding and cross-shareholding models have also become increasingly common.27  
Among all the chaebols, the top 30 groups account for two-thirds of shipments in South Korea’s 
manufacturing and mining sector, a quarter of sales in services and 32% of total national sales, while 
Samsung Group, Hyundai Motor Group, SK Group and LG, account for nearly half of stock market 
capitalisation.28  While Samsung Group, Hyundai Motor Group, SK Group, LG  are the largest four 
chaebols29, Forbes Global 200030 provides a different ranking of the individual companies, as separate from 
chaebols. 
 
There are power and influence matrixes that exist beyond the contemporary structures of the state-chaebols 
links.   Chaebols have connections with political, economic, judicial and social institutions.  From the 1980s 
financial deregulation till the 1997 Asian economic crisis, vertically integrated chaebols entered into 
finance and banking sectors, became more independent on investment decisions but still continue to enjoy 
the assistance of the state.31  The state, by contrast chose to re-regulate the finance and banking sectors in 
the post-Asian crisis period.32  While chaebols were once able to usurp affiliate funds, in the post-1997 
crisis regulatory period this practice became untenable.33  The state investment is also directly relevant to 
the South Korean economy as state-owned-enterprises have been essential to the economy since the 1950s 
and despite the privatisations of the 1980s and 1990s, essential services and utilities remain as the property 
of the state.34   
 
Table 2: Top four nations with large state-owned sectors35 
Rank by corporate valuation Country Employee Numbers Value (US$) 
1 China 20.2 million 29.2 trillion 
2 India 3.3 million 338.5 billion 
3 Korea 147,833 217.8 billion 
4 Italy 499,765 207.5 billion 
 
 
25 Soyon Kim (2016) ’Global Capital, Business Groups and State Coordination’.  Social Studies.  11 (1): 145-173. 
Jae Yong Shin, Jeong-Hoon Hyun, Seungbin Oh and| Hongsuk Yang (2016). ‘The effects of politically connected outside directors on firm 
performance’.  Corporate Governance International Review.  26:23–44. 
26 Tan Aik Seng (2017) ‘The Changing Arena of Power Contestation Between the State and Chaebols in South Korea.  Cornell International Affairs 
Review.  11(1). 
27 Hong-min Chun (2019) ‘CEO pay disparity, chaebol affiliations, and implied cost of equity capital’.  Finance Research Letters.  31: 480–488. 
Jaimin Goh, Wonwook Choi and Jungeun Cho (2016a) ‘Changes in chaebol firms’ overinvestment after the Asian financial crisis’.  Asia-Pacific 
Journal of Accounting and Economics.  23(1): 75-111. 
Taeyoon Sung and Doyeon Kim (2017) ‘How chaebol restructuring after the 1997 crisis has affected corporate decision and performance in 
Korea’.  China Economic Journal.  10(2): 147-161. 
28 OECD (2018a) OECD Economic Surveys: Korea 2018.  Paris: OECD Publishing. 
29 Chae Yun-Hwan (2019b) ‘FTC names 59 chaebol to 2019 watch list’.  Korea Joong Ang Daily.  15 May.  . 
30 Fortune 2000 (2019) www.fortune.com. 
31 Jiyoung Kim (2017) ‘Corporate financial structure of South Korea after Asian financial crisis’.  Economic Structures.  6(24): 2-14. 
Byung-Kook Kim and Hyug-Baeg Im (2001) Crony Capitalism in South Korea, Thailand and Taiwan.  Journal of East Asian Studies. 1(1): 5-52. 
32 Hong Yung Lee (2008) ‘A Comparative Study of Korean, Chinese, and Japanese Traditional Family and Contemporary Business Organizations’.  
EAI Working Paper Series. 14. 
33 Jaimin Goh, Jaehong Lee and Jungeun Cho (2016b) ‘A New Relationship between Ownership’.  Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies.  45: 
222-253. 
34 Kyoungsun Heo (2018) ‘Effects of Corporate Governance on the Performance of State-Owned Enterprises’.  World Bank Group.  Governance 
Global Practice. 
35 OECD (2017b) The Size and Sectoral Distribution of State-Owned Enterprises.  Paris: OECD Publishing. 
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The South Korean state investment in the domestic economy is approximately 5 percent of the GDP and 17 
percent of all investment.36  South Korea has the third global ranking in terms of the value that state-owned-
enterprises hold in the national economy.  By contrast, the Chinese state ownership in the entire national 
economy is approximately one-third of all the shares for Chinese listed corporations, including SOEs,37 
plus it also owns the unlisted state-owned-enterprises and the public utility companies, which are the largest 
in the world.  The South Korean state has ownership in many businesses such as Korea Electric Power 
Corporation (Forbes global rank 588), Industrial Bank of Korea (rank 616), Korean Gas Corporation (rank 
984) and Korean Investment Corporation (rank 1441).  There are also formerly state-owned but now-
privatized enterprises such as Korea Telecom Corporation (rank 940) in which National Pension Service is 
still a shareholder.  To conclude this section, the state ownership in South Korea is not insignificant yet 
quite minimal in comparison to the Chinese economy. 
 
CHAEBOLS AND SMALL & MEDIUM ENTERPRISES 
Until the end of the 1980s, the South Korean state was less supportive of small and medium size enterprises 
(SME) and their financial needs.38  However, SMEs occupy a substantial place in the South Korean 
economy.  The relationship between SMEs and the South Korean state appears to be almost an afterthought, 
as these are a set of economic agencies the significance of which became apparent in the globalisation phase 
of the mature-industrialisation period.  The state has become aware of the importance of the support for 
SMEs for them to grow with the rest of the national economy and the global market.39  Global restructuring 
in the 1990s and the decline in the labor intensive industries began to reduce the chaebols’ employee 
numbers.40  Despite the chaebols’ dominance of the economy, the value-added share  and the employee 
numbers of SMEs in the national economy began to increase in the 1990s.41  This structured duality of 
chaebols and SMEs and their co-dependency forms a primary characteristic of the South Korean economy.  
Overall, South Korea’s domestic supply chain is a massive network of chaebols and SMEs.  The South 
Korean SMEs employ 87.9 percent of the national labor market, create 51.2 percent of the added-value of 
national output and are responsible for 37.5 percent of the exports.42   
 
Table 3: South Korean manufacturing industry value-added distribution (%) (2014)43 
  Heavy Industries Light Industries 
SME 41.3 84.6 
Chaebol 58.7 15.4 
 
In 1962-2014, the SMEs contributed nearly half of the value-added production.44  The significance of 
these SME figures is apparent in their inclusion of domestic supply chain firms in the country.  The origin 
of this duality lies in the South Korean state and chaebols’ coordination to maintain stable domestic 
supply chains.  Chaebols emerged out of the South Korean economy with their domestic supply chain 
network upon which they remain reliant.45   
 
36 OECD (2017a) Government at a Glance Chapter 2 Public Finance and Economics, Figure 2.48. Government investment as percentage of GDP, 
2007, 2009, 2015 and 2016.  Available at <www.oecd.com>.  Accessed 16 March 2020. 
37 Xiaohong Huang, Rezaul Kabir and Lingling Zhang (2018) ‘Government ownership and the capital structure of firms: Analysis of an 
institutional context from China’.  China Journal of Accounting Research.  11: 171–185. 
38 Yong-Chool Ha and Wang Hwi Lee (2007) ‘The Politics of Economic Reform in South Korea’.  Asian Survey. 47(6): 894-914. 
Byung-Kook Kim and Hyug-Baeg Im (2001) Crony Capitalism in South Korea, Thailand and Taiwan.  Journal of East Asian Studies. 1(1): 5-52. 
39 Eun Mee Kim (2015) Korea’s Evolving Government Business Relationship.  United Nations University World Institute for Development 
Economics Research. 
Su-Yol Lee and Robert D. Klassen (2008) ‘Drivers and Enablers that Foster Environmental Management Capabilities in Small and Medium-Sized 
Suppliers in Supply Chains’. Production and Operations Management.  17(6): 573-586. 
40 Keunsoo Kim (2013) ‘Chaebols and Their Effect on Economic Growth in South Korea’.  Korean Social Sciences Review.  3(2): 1-28. 
41 Cheonsik Woo and Kwang-Eon Sul (2001) Industrial Upgrading of Korea.  Korea Development Institute. 
42 Ministry of SMEs and Start-ups (2019) ‘Status of Korean SMEs’. Available at 
<https://www.mss.go.kr/site/eng/02/20202000000002019110610.jsp>.  Accessed 16 March 2019. 
43 OECD (2018b) Enhancing Dynamism in SME and Entrepreneurship in Korea.  Economics Department Working Papers No. 1510. 
44 Yong-Hwan Noh (2017) ‘Status of Korean SMEs and Policy Tasks for the Implementation of SME centred Economy’.  Korea Development 
Institute Journal of Economic Policy Conference.  December. 
45 Su-Yol Lee and Robert D. Klassen (2008) ‘Drivers and Enablers that Foster Environmental Management Capabilities in Small and Medium-
Sized Suppliers in Supply Chains’. Production and Operations Management.  17(6): 573-586. 
Wonhyuk Lim (2012) ‘Chaebol and Industrial Policy in Korea’.  Asian Economic Policy Review.  7: 69-86. 
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Table 4: Korean labor market distribution by company size46 
SME Chaebol 
87.9 12.1 
 
The extent of the partnership between the South Korean state and chaebols is still clearly visible as, in 2019, 
the state made new investments in the domestic industries to create new SME supply chains and revitalize 
manufacturing.47  Table 1 provides a brief review of the chaebols’ literature, in terms of their value-added 
production share of the South Korean GDP.   The point of this argument is to emphasise the weight of the 
profit-driven private ownership in the national economy which is geared toward global investment and 
trade.  In terms of manufacturing, South Korean SMEs have a larger share of the light industries but also 
have a substantial share of the heavy industries (Table 3).   The financial structures of SMEs are dependent 
on the financial sector which chaebols dominate.48  The increase in chaebols’ dominance of the service 
sector, with the accompanying increase in their economic power after the 1997 crisis, has reduced the 
percentages of the self-employed and long term employed in the national labor market but increased the 
percentage of the casual work.49  That is, the national labor market has become increasingly more directly 
affected by the strategies of chaebols. 
 
THE BEIJING CONSENSUS AND THE BRI 
China’s rapid surge in trade and investment engagements in Asia, Africa and Latin America from the 2000s 
onward has become informally known as the Beijing Consensus, in contrast to the perceived limitations of 
the Washington Consensus policies in the same geographies.50 The Washington Consensus encompasses 
the institutions of the Bretton Wood system, the United Nations, the IMF, World Bank and WTO all of 
which China joined over an extended period of time.  The Beijing Consensus, and its creation the BRI, 
massively rely on bilateral trade deals, Chinese state credit system and the AIIB.  The Beijing Consensus 
essentially represents the growth in the Chinese economy and the rapid rise in the Chinese state’s 
international expansion; foreign investment, trade and credit supply.  This is arguably a new mercantilist 
economic system.51  The critiques of the Chinese mercantilism focus on the institutions and practices of the 
state-dominated economy, export-driven economic growth, foreign investment-attracting policies with 
clearly set domestic market benefits such as technology transfer, loose intellectual property regulation, 
underpaid labor market segments, state-owned and/or state-directed financial system, undervalued currency 
to cheapen exports, massive foreign reserves accumulation, continuous and targeted strategic acquisition 
of foreign assets and natural resources.52  The BRI is viewed, in this context, as the future of the Chinese 
 
Carlos Sakuramoto, Luiz Carlos Di Serio and Alexandre de Vicente Bittara (2019) ‘Impact of supply chain on the competitiveness of the 
automotive industry’.  RAUSP Management Journal.  54(2): 206-225. 
46 Ministry of SMEs and Start-ups (2019) ‘Status of Korean SMEs’. Available at 
<https://www.mss.go.kr/site/eng/02/20202000000002019110610.jsp>.  Accessed 16 March 2019. 
47 Yun-Hwan Chae (2019a) ‘[Sustainable Future] Local production could be the key to global success’.  Available at 
<http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com>.  Accessed 16 March 2020. 
Sung-hyun Lim and Lee Eun-joo (2019) ‘Korea pledges $5 bn funding to groom local supply chain for chip industry’.  Available at 
<https://pulsenews.co.kr>.  Accessed 16 March 2020. 
Ju-min Park (2019) ‘Supply chain pain’.  Available at <https://www.reuters.com>.  Accessed 16 March 2020. 
48 Jiyoung Kim (2017) ‘Corporate financial structure of South Korea after Asian financial crisis’.  Economic Structures.  6(24): 2-14. 
Solee I. Shin  and  Lanu Kim (2019) ‘Chaebol and the Turn to Services.  Journal of Contemporary Asia.  1-24. 
Ji-Whan Yun (2010) ‘The Myth of Confucian Capitalism in South Korea’.  Pacific Affairs.  83(2): 237-229.   
49 Jiyoung Kim (2017) ‘Corporate financial structure of South Korea after Asian financial crisis’.  Economic Structures.  6(24): 2-14. 
50 Lai Ha Chan, Pak K. Lee and Gerald Chan (2008) ‘Rethinking Global Governance’. Contemporary Politics. 14(1): 3-19. 
Arif Dirlik (2004) ‘Beijing Consensus: Beijing ‘Gongshi’.  Globalization and Autonomy Online Compendium.  Mimeo. 
Max Rebol (2010) ‘Why the Beijing Consensus is a Non-Consensus: Implications for Contemporary China-Africa Relations’.  Culture Mandala. 
9(1): 7-20. 
51 Jennifer Lind and Daryl G. Press (2018) ‘Markets or Mercantilism’.  International Security.  42 (4): 170-204. 
Marcel Schroder (2017) ‘Mercantilism and China's hunger for international reserves.’  China Economic Review.  42 (February):  15-33. 
52 Joshua Aizenman, Yothin Jinjarak and Huanhuan Zheng (2018) ‘Chinese outwards mercantilism.  The art and practice of bundling’.  Journal of 
International Money and Finance.  86 (September): 31-49. 
Dani Rodrik (2010) ‘Is Chinese Mercantilism Good or Bad for Poor Countries’.  Project Syndicate. 
Michael Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau, and Peter Garber (2004) ‘The Revived Bretton Woods System’. NBER Working Paper 10332.  National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
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mercantilism as it is defined to be a demand creation project for two distinct zones of the state-owned or 
state-dominated internationalized businesses: the Chinese state finance (that has access to the Chinese 
state’s vast foreign reserves) and the construction, logistics and utilities.53  Under the BRI, the Chinese state 
is projected to be the premier creditor.   
 
Conceptual Model 254: The origins of the Beijing Consensus  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHINESE BUSINESS SYSTEMS 
Since the late 1990s, the Chinese state has pursued global infrastructure projects that have all become 
integrated into the platform of the BRI.55  The value of China’s overseas investment and construction 
combined, since 2005, is $2 trillion and the BRI represents the largest share.56  There are several emergent 
critiques of the BRI and its visions.57  Overall, the Chinese state and companies have been greatly increasing 
their power in geographies where the BRI projects are built and related to this process is the need to consider 
how the companies of other nations will fare.  For this, it is necessary to understand how the BRI has been 
structured by the Chinese state.  That particular question is the origin of this discussion that focuses on the 
model of the Chinese international business as built by the Chinese state.  The BRI has several facets: 
market creation, financial system creation, infrastructure construction, land and maritime trade route 
building, power generation and distribution. The BRI is a structured global extension of the existing Chinese 
business systems, domestic and international.   
 
Yang Jiang (2015) ‘Vulgarisation of Keynesianism in China's response to the global financial crisis’.  Review of International Political Economy. 
22(2): 360-390. 
Charles E. Ziegler and Rajan Menon (2014) ‘Russia, China, and the United States are Neomercantilism and Great-Power Energy Competition in 
Central Asia and the Caspian’. Strategic Studies Quarterly.  Summer: 17-41. 
Zhang Xiaotong and James Keith (2017) ‘From Wealth to Power: China's New Economic Statecraft’.  The Washington Quarterly. 40(1): 185-203. 
53 Simeon Djankov and Sean Miner (eds) (2016) ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Motives, Scope, and Challenges’.  Peterson Institute for 
International Economics.  March. 
David Dollar (2015) ‘China’s Rise as a Regional and Global Power: The AIIB and the One Belt, One Road’.  Brookings Paper. 
David Jones and Hanzhen Liu (2017) ‘Management of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment: “One Belt, One Road” across Eurasia to Africa and 
Europe Amidst Maritime Tensions in the South China Sea Region’.  International Relations and Diplomacy.  5(8): 486-500. 
54 The author’s conceptualization. 
55 Hong Yu (2017) ‘China's Belt and Road Initiative and Its Implications for Southeast Asia’. Asia Policy. 24: 117-122.  
Joel Wuthnow (2012) ‘Chinese Perspectives on the Belt Road Initiative’.  INSS.  China Strategic Perspectives.  No 12. 
56 AEI, American Enterprise Institute (2019) ‘Worldwide Chinese Investments & Construction (2005 - 2019)'.  Available at: 
<http://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/>.  Accessed 27 August 2019. 
57 Xue Gong (2018) ‘The Belt & Road Initiative and China’s influence in Southeast Asia’. The Pacific Review. 32(4): 635-665. 
The Deng Modernizations.  
From the early 1980s onward.
Invesment, finance and trade 
relations with the EU, North 
America, Japan.  From the 
1990s onward.
The rise of the Beijing 
Consensus.  China's financier 
and merchantile capitalist 
engagement. From the 2000s 
onward.
The Belt and Road Initiative, 
the restructuring of the  
Beijing Consensus.  From 
the 2010s onward.
Continuous integration with 
the Bretton Woods 
framework, the global 
investment, finance & trade 
environment.  From the late 
1980s onward.
 8 
 
Conceptual Model 358: Chinese business systems  
 
 
 
 
In System 1 (formed in the 1950s-1990s),  the Chinese SOEs characterized the domestic economy in the 
timeline from the Mao’s rule throughout the maturation of the Deng modernizations and the 1990s’ 
privatization of the SOEs.59  In System 2 (formed in the 1990s-Present), at the end of the major privatization 
phase of many SOEs in the 1990s and with the emergence of private MNEs, the Chinese state gained a 
clearer rentier characteristic.  The economy became divided into ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ domains.  
The rents that are extracted from the private businesses profits downstream (privately owned corporations 
and some of the privatized state-owned-enterprises) are being used to finance, partially, the upstream; state-
owned-enterprises operating domestically (as monopolies) and internationally (as strategic investors, 
procurers and traders).60  System 2 represents the present snapshot of the Chinese international business and 
the origins of its competitive advantages with a view of its current development into the BRI (System 3).  
Chinese international business activities have a co-dependence with the Chinese rentier state finances.  This 
status is preserved in System 3 which includes the Chinese-owned BRI infrastructure (transport, 
communication, logistics and technology) as the purchaser, with the enterprises/governments from the BRI 
members, of the output from the Business Systems 1 and 2.  Notionally, System 3 is a type of ‘plug-in’ 
point for the BRI membership and while the credit supply comes from the Chinese state, the profits will 
feed into the upper levels. 
 
 
 
58 The author’s conceptualization 
59 Ann Harrison, Marshall Meyer, Peichun Wang, Linda Zhao and Minyuan Zhao (2019) ‘Can a Tiger Change Its Stripes?’.  NBER Working Paper 
25475.   
Hongxia Chai and Xiongwei Song (2013) ‘The adaptive state, understanding political reform in China’. Policy Studies. 34(1): 73-88. 
Wanfa Zhang and Feng Sun (2012) ‘Resurrection through Adaptation’.  Journal of Comparative Asian Development. 11(2): 349-378. 
60 Otaviao Canuto (2019) ‘China’s Growth Rebalance with Downslide’.  Policy Center for the New South.  PB 19 07. 
Chih shian Liou (2017) ‘Varieties of State Capitalism across the Taiwan Strait’, pp. 117-132 in Dittmer Lowell (ed) Taiwan and China.  Oakland, 
California: University of California Press. 
Ruiming Liu (2019) ‘Upstream Monopoly’, pp. 97-113 Ruiming Liu (ed) How State-owned Enterprises Drag on Economic Growth.  Berlin: 
Springer Verlag. 
Xiaodong Zhu (2012) ‘Understanding China’s Growth: Past, Present, and Future’.  Journal of Economic Perspectives.  26(4): 103–124. 
System 1.  Monopolistic SOEs as 
producers of goods and services run 
the sectors of energy, utility, telco, 
media, logistics, banking-finance-
insurance, materials, infrastructure 
and administration.
System 2.  Private enterprises 
[privatised SOEs and new private 
enterprises] are the purchasers of 
outputs from Business System1 for 
their manufacturing and export of of 
goods and services.
System 3.  China's BRI infrastructure 
and the enterprises/governments of 
other BRI nations are the purchasers 
of the outputs from the Systems 1 and 
2.  
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SOUTH KOREA AND CHINA FTA 
During the Cold War, South Korean and Chinese companies were banned from having direct relations, 
whereby until 1988, all negotiations took place in Hong Kong, and the two nations did not have diplomatic 
ties until 1992.61  In 2015, the two signed a free trade agreement (FTA) which has attracted varying 
commentary.62 Tables 6 to 9 present a brief snapshot of South Korea’s trade content and bilateralism with 
China.  The bilateral aims and intentions aside, the FTA has not, arguably, provided the South Korean 
businesses better access to the Chinese market and what appeared to be newly acquired opportunities in 
China had been actually guaranteed by the Chinese commitments as per the conditions of joining the WTO 
in 2001, thus the FTA has neither bolstered commerce nor led to further market liberalizations in China.63  
Stand-alone agreements may fare rather poorly in a context that is the playing field of much larger forces.  
The US and China trade disputes, and the lack of a Pacific and East Asian multilateral trade and investment 
system (such as the now-defunct Trans Pacific Partnership) have both shown to have a negative impact on 
the South Korea-China FTA.64  The FTA’s background was that South Korea’s export-oriented growth 
strategy formed the basis of its link to the Chinese economy,  which was a situation unsustainable in the 
long term.65  In the public sphere, most South Koreans view China as a competitor due several reasons that 
include to the South Korea’s Cold War experiences followed by China’s post-Cold War activities to project 
its hard power in Asia such as the South China Sea militarisation, the Koguryo Dynasty issue of the mid-
2000s, and the China’s economic retaliation, the so called de facto sanctions of 2017, as a response to the 
THAAD system deployment.66  
 
The de facto sanctions bypassed the bilateral electronics manufacturing trade (thus shielding the Chinese 
enterprises) but focused on the South Korean service sector thereby showing that there is an inherently 
asymmetrically reciprocal interdependence between the two nations that can disadvantage South Korea.67  
This made South Korea re-examine the nature of its economic links with China and create its ‘New Southern 
Policy’ to further strengthen its ties with South East Asia and India.68   As its competitive-export-driven 
economy matured, South Korea had already begun to modify its existing industrial structure that would 
also lead to a reduction on its reliance on the existing relationship with China.69  China too has been focusing 
more on the next stage of its industrial development which may not necessarily eventuate in further 
liberalization of the foreign investment environment.70  As such, there is concern in South Korea that  China 
will eventually move toward putting up protective barriers for a range of its industries.71  Such development 
would naturally dissolve the FTA substantially, and may make the BRI (or its future version) more 
significant. 
 
South Korea is the fifth largest export economy globally and occupies the sixth position in Economic 
Complexity Index (ECI) that measures relative knowledge intensity of an economy by considering the 
knowledge intensity of the products it exports.72  South Korea, along with Japan and Taiwan, is exporter of 
sophisticated components to China which, in turn, assembles them into final products, and all of these 
activities form the largest segment of the present global value chains (GVCs).73  Table 5 shows the level of 
sophistication attained by the South Korean enterprises since 1987.  South Korean exports and imports both 
have China as the prime location, defining the nature of the ‘asymmetrically reciprocal interdependence’. 
 
61 Hyejin Kim (2018) ‘Transnational Korean Networks and Business in China’.  Europe-Asia Studies.  70(7): 1143-1158. 
62 Muhui Zhang (2018b) ‘Proceeding in hardship’.  The Pacific Review.  31(1): 57-75. 
63 Inkyo Cheong (2016) ‘Analysis of the FTA Negotiation between China and Korea’.  Asian Economic Papers. 15(3): 170-187. 
64 Youngmi Choi (2018) ‘A middle power’s trade policy under U.S.-China FTA competition’: South Korea’s double hedging FTA diplomacy, 
Contemporary Politics, 24:2, 233-249. 
65 Jong-Wha Lee (2016) ‘Korea’s Economic Growth and Catch-up’.  China & World Economy.  24(5): 71-97. 
66 Min-gyu Lee and Yufan Hao (2018) ‘China’s Unsuccessful Charm Offensive’.  Journal of Contemporary China.  27(114): 867-886. 
67 Florence (Wen-Ting) Yang (2020) ‘Asymmetrical Interdependence and Sanction’.  Issues & Studies: A Social Science Quarterly on China, 
Taiwan, and East Asian Affairs.  55(4): 1-39. 
68 Wooyeal Paik (2020) ‘The politics of Chinese tourism in South Korea’. The Pacific Review.  33(2): 331-355. 
69 Seung Hyok Lee and Wooyeal Paik (2018) ‘Is South Korea Leaning Toward China’.  Pacific Focus.  33(2): 237–259. 
70 Jungmin Lee and Jai S. Mah (2018) ‘Korea’s Foreign Direct Investment in the Automotive Industry in China’.  China Report.  54(2):175-193 
71 Hyuntai Lee, Jangho Choi, Hyelin Choi, Yongsun Kim and Joonkoo Lee (2018) ‘China’s Manufacturing Development and Its Implications for 
Korea’.  World Economic Brief 8(18): 1-5. 
72 OEC (2020a) ‘Economic Complexity Rankings’. The Observatory of Economic Complexity.  Available at <www.oec.com>. 
73 WTO (2020) ‘Trade in value-added and global value chains’.  Available at <www.wto.org>.  Accessed 3 March 2020. 
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South Korea is the prime import location for China but it is not among China’s top five export destinations.   
Crude petroleum is in the top two imports for both countries that show their external energy dependency.  
The two nations’ integration through the GVCs is also evident in their dependence on the integrated circuit 
trade. 
 
Table 5: Economic Complexity Index74 
  1987 Rank 1987 Value 2017 Rank 2017 Value 
Korea 19 0.92 6 1.78 
China 40 0.13 33 0.69 
 
Table 6: South Korea Top Five Trade Partners75 
Exports % of total Imports % of total 
China 25 China 21 
US 12 Japan 11 
Vietnam 8 US 10 
Hong Kong 5.8 Germany 4.2 
Japan 4.5 Australia 3.8 
 
Table 7: China Top Five Trade Partners76 
Exports % of total Imports % of total 
US 20 Korea 9.7 
Japan 6.5 Japan 8.8 
Germany 4.5 US 8.7 
Korea 4.1 Germany 6.2 
Vietnam 2.9 Australia 5.5 
 
The Chinese industries have continuously competed on labor cost as they entered into the global trade and 
investment environment and were served well by the support from the major Western economies.77  South 
Korean chaebols, by contrast, have managed to carve out a niche in global markets where they were late 
entrants, such as the automobile manufacturing in the 1970s and  mobile phone manufacturing in the 
1990s.78  South Korean trade content has a certain level of overlap with that of China that shows the matter 
of the ‘asymmetrically reciprocal interdependence’ in its present form.  It is possible to observe the 2015 
FTA as an outcome of the post-Cold War policy direction searches that signified different intentions and 
perceptions.  For China, the FTA was a tactic within a wider strategy.   
 
Table 8: South Korea Top Five Trade Content79 
Exports % of total Imports % of total 
Integrated circuits 17 Crude petroleum 12 
Cars 6.7 Integrated circuits 8.2 
Refined petroleum 5.5 Petroleum gas 3.7 
Passenger and cargo ships 4.1 Photo lab equipment 2.9 
Vehicle parts 3.2 Refined petroleum 2.8 
 
This is more so, as China is the epicenter of the most of the GVCs and  at the intersection of others.   China 
wanted to demonstrate its own way of coping against the (now-defunct) TPP by actively promoting the 
FTA with South Korea,  the ‘FTA in Asia Pacific’ for the APEC membership the ‘One Belt One Road’ 
(OBOR) for Central Asia and the EU, all at the same time.80  China may have been self-assured that the 
South Korean FTA would be eventually rolled into the OBOR.  Of course, the OBOR, then, mutated into 
 
74 OEC (2020a) ‘Economic Complexity Rankings’. The Observatory of Economic Complexity.  Available at <www.oec.com>. Accessed 4 March 
2020. 
75 OEC (2020b) ‘South Korea’. The Observatory of Economic Complexity.  Available at <www.oec.com>. Accessed 4 March 2020. 
76 OEC (2020c) ‘China’. The Observatory of Economic Complexity.  Available at <www.oec.com>. Accessed 4 March 2020.  
77 Celal Bayari (2018) ‘Economy and Market in China’.  Academy of Taiwan Business Management Review.  14(1): 13-36. 
78 Joonkoo Lee, Jong-Cheol Kim and Jinho Lim (2016) ‘Globalization and Divergent Paths of Industrial Development’.  Journal of Contemporary 
Asia.  46(2): 222-246. 
79 OEC (2020b) ‘South Korea’. The Observatory of Economic Complexity.  Available at <www.oec.com>. Accessed 4 March 2020 
80 Inkyo Cheong (2016) ‘Analysis of the FTA Negotiation between China and Korea’.  Asian Economic Papers. 15(3): 170-187. 
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the BRI with an enhanced significance.  China’s ambitious path to link several continents does not 
necessarily include the change of status quo in the Korean Peninsula, as its strategic goals involve the 
maintenance of extra-territorial stability in the bordering countries such as North Korea.81  The South 
Korean and Chinese economies, with their very own respective characteristics and differences from 
Western models, are two very different domains of global capitalism.82   
 
Table 9: China Top Five Trade Content83 
Exports % of total Imports % of total 
Broadcasting equipment 9.6 Integrated circuits 13 
Computers 6.1 Crude petroleum 9.4 
Office machine parts 3.8 Iron ore 3.8 
Integrated circuits 3.3 Cars 3 
Telephones 2.6 Gold 2.6 
 
Table 10: South Korean top export industries.  Domestic and foreign value-added % share in industry total 
gross exports84 
  Domestic value-added Foreign value-added 
Computer and electronic products 64.1 35.9 
Motor vehicles 72.8 27.2 
Chemical products 64.8 35.2 
 
There is not sufficient space here to discuss the term of ‘Confucian capitalism’, which is a significant 
paradigm that the analysts have applied to the business models of South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, China and 
Singapore.85  Indeed, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and China are the dominant partners of the GVCs.  What 
is unique about East Asian capitalisms is the role of the state in the development, moderation, modification 
and maintenance of the business systems.86  In this context, the BRI appears as an ‘alternative future’ 
scenario, for East Asia, to the present state of multilateralism that the mature East Asian capitalist models: 
South Korea, Japan and Taiwan have long been engaged alongside the rest of the industrial world.87   
 
There are variety of opinions on the BRI among the South Korean political, business and public spheres.88  
South Korea responded to the unfolding of the BRI and its implications, in October 2013, with the former 
President Park’s Eurasia Initiative which was directed as stronger economic ties to connect better with 
Europe, and, as stated above, following China’s April 2017 de facto sanctions, with President Moon’s New 
Southern Policy, in November 2017, as the nation viewed Beijing’s BRI goals as being subordinate 
components of broader national goals with the BRI itself as an attempt by Beijing’s leadership to shape the 
rules and norms governing the surrounding regions to better reflect Beijing’s preferences.89  In South 
Korea’s neighbouring region, there is consensus over the BRI’s role in the expansion of the Chinese 
business systems even though there are doubts over the feasibility of the initiative itself.90    
 
CONCLUSION: CHAEBOLS, THE GVCS AND CHINA 
The above discussion has discussed the significance of the chaebols in the formation of the South Korean 
markets, in context of multilateralism that characterised the post-Second World War order.  In the case of 
 
81 Balbina Y. Hwang (2019) ‘Northeast Asian Perspectives on China’s Belt Road Initiative’.  East Asia.  36:129–150. 
82 Arif Dirlik (1997) ‘Critical reflections on “Chinese capitalism” as paradigm’.  Identities Global Studies in Culture and Power.  3(3): 303-330. 
83 OEC (2020b) ‘South Korea’. The Observatory of Economic Complexity.  Available at <www.oec.com>. Accessed 4 March 2020. 
84 WTO (2020) ‘Trade in value-added and global value chains’.  Available at <www.wto.org>.  Accessed 3 March 2020. 
85 Seong Hwan Cha (2003) ‘Myth and Reality in the Discourse of Confucian Capitalism in Korea’.  Asian Survey.  43(3): 485-506. 
Sun-Ki Chai and Mooweon Rhee (2010) ‘Confucian Capitalism and the Paradox of Closure and Structural Holes in East Asian Firms’.  
Management and Organization Review.  6(1): 5-29. 
86 I-Liang Wahn (2018) ‘The state–consumer relationship and the instituting of consumer protection in East Asian societies’.  Journal of 
Consumer Culture.  19(1): 82-103. 
87 Tristan Kenderdine (2018) ‘Death of the East Asian Goose and the Rise of China’s Geoindustrial Policy’.  Journal of Chinese Political Science.  
23: 437-453. 
88 David Hundt and Sooyoung Kim (2019) ‘Elite Opinion and the “Belt and Road” Debate in South Korea’.  Pacific Affairs.  92(1): 27-48. 
89 Balbina Y. Hwang (2019) ‘Northeast Asian Perspectives on China’s Belt Road Initiative’.  East Asia.  36:129–150. 
90 Xue Gong (2019) ‘The Belt & Road Initiative and China’s influence in Southeast Asia’.  The Pacific Review.  32(4): 635-665. 
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China, the state involvement in the business systems is a ‘strategic going concern,’ and not, yet, in a phase 
of devolvement to profit-seeking market activity.  Chaebols, with the continuing necessity of expanding 
out of the domestic market, begun, in the 1980s, to join the MNEs that manufacture in several countries.91  
There is earlier coverage of the chaebol integration with the GVCs from the 1990s onward.92  Tables 11 
and 12 present the current engagement of the South Korean economy with the GVCs. 
 
Table 11: South Korean forward participation in the GVCs.  % share in total exports of domestic inputs sent 
to third countries93 
Computer and electronic products 19 
Wholesale and retail trade 10.6 
Motor vehicles 7.4 
 
Table 12: South Korean backward participation in the GVCs.  % share in total foreign content of exports94 
Computer and electronic products 24.4 
Motor vehicles 11.4 
Chemical products 8.4 
 
The position of chaebols in the GVCs, from the early 1990s onward, has been characterised as, being, 
primarily, highly export oriented brand manufacturers and, secondarily, as specialised suppliers, in specific 
niches that are not in direct competition with the matured East Asian business systems of Japan and 
Taiwan.95  That is, from the start of the globalisation of investment and trade period, chaebols have 
strategically attempted to avoid competing with the existing market actors.  MNE trade and FDI activities 
appear as the prime drivers of the GVCs.96  To state the obvious, MNEs are extensions of the respective 
nation states’ business systems out of which they emerge and on which they remain reliant.97  MNEs and 
their foreign affiliates represent 28 percent of the global GDP.98  From the mid 2000s onwards, MNEs and 
GVCs activities have become further synchronized.99  MNEs have increasingly come to function as 
networks within the international production networks of GVCs, though sometimes the boundaries and 
structures of GVCs overlap with those of MNEs and the GVCs’ set-ups as networks across multiple borders 
provide MNEs with a large degree of strategic and operational flexibility.100  The entrance of developing 
nations into the GVCs as suppliers led to high expectations.101 The GVCs have allowed the integration of 
 
91 Joonkoo Lee, Jong-Cheol Kim and Jinho Lim (2016) ‘Globalization and Divergent Paths of Industrial Development’.  Journal of Contemporary 
Asia.  46(2): 222-246. 
Seungrae Lee and Seung Jae Park (2016) ‘Global Production vs. Inventory Supply and Financial Performance’.  Management Science and 
Financial Engineering.  22(1): 21-26. 
92 Du Sig Choi, Paul Michell and Dayananda Palihawadana (2008) ‘Exploring the components of success for the Korean chaebol’.  Journal of 
Business and Industrial Marketing.  23(5): 311–322. 
Yongwook Jun and Dong-Soon Kim (2008) ‘Korean Chaebol’, pp: 25-53 in Kim, Young Chan, Kim Doo Jin, Young Jun Kim (eds) (2008) South 
Korea.  Oxford: Chandos Publishing. 
Eun Mee Kim (2015) Korea’s Evolving Government Business Relationship.  United Nations University World Institute for Development 
Economics Research. 
Joonkoo Lee, Jong-Cheol Kim and Jinho Lim (2016) ‘Globalization and Divergent Paths of Industrial Development’.  Journal of Contemporary 
Asia.  46(2): 222-246. 
Wonhyuk Lim (2012) ‘Chaebol and Industrial Policy in Korea’.  Asian Economic Policy Review.  7: 69-86. 
Henry Wai Chung Yeung (2014) ‘Governing the Market in a Globalising Era: Developmental states’.  Review of International Political Economy. 
21 (1): 70–101. 
93 WTO (2020) ‘Trade in value-added and global value chains’.  Available at <www.wto.org>.  Accessed 3 March 2020. 
94 WTO (2020) ‘Trade in value-added and global value chains’.  Available at <www.wto.org>.  Accessed 3 March 2020. 
95 Joonkoo Lee, Jong-Cheol Kim and Jinho Lim (2016) ‘Globalization and Divergent Paths of Industrial Development’.  Journal of Contemporary 
Asia.  46(2): 222-246. 
96 Claes Alvstam, Inge Ivarsson and Bent Petersen (2019) ‘Are multinationals and governments from emerging economies configuring global 
value chains in new ways?  International Journal of Emerging Markets.  15(1): 111-130. 
In Song Kim, Helen V. Milner, Thomas Bernauer, Iain Osgood, Gabriele Spilker and Dustin Tingley  (2019)  ‘Firms and Global Value Chains’.  
International Studies Quarterly.  1–15. 
97 Peter Dicken (1999) Global Shift.  Transforming the World Economy.  Third Edition.  London: PCP. 
Paul Doremus, William W. Keller, Louis W. Pauly, and Simon Reich (1999) The Myth of the Global Corporation.  NJ: Princeton University Press. 
98 OECD (2019) Multinational Enterprises in Domestic Value Chains.  OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers.  63.  Paris: OECD. 
99 Charlie Joyez (2019) ‘Alignment of Multinational Firms along Global Value Chains’.  GREDEG Working Papers Series.  No 2019 05. 
100 Charles Koen De Backer Cadestin, Isabelle Desnoyers-James, Sébastien Miroudot, Ming Ye and Davide Rigo (2018) Multinational Enterprises 
and Global Value Chains: New Insights on the Trade- Investment Nexus.  Paris: OECD. 
101 APEC (2014) Integrating SMEs into Global Value Chains: Policy.  APEC Policy Support Unit.  Issues Paper No 6. 
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many developing nations’ domestic companies into the global economy but the increasing cost-cutting 
activities through automation and the application new digital technologies can shrink the length of the 
GVCs and widen disparities between regions.102  The respective business systems of East Asian capitalism, 
South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and China, each use the GVCs in a different modulation to augment their 
respective competitive advantages.  South Korea’s top three exports have high domestic value-added 
content but their reliance on the GVCs is clear.  This is somewhat of a problem.   
 
The GVCs are not neutral mediums of barter nor are they equitable benefit redistribution platforms.  They 
are instruments of the market exchange.  Due to the increasing competition between China and South Korea 
in advanced markets, the industrial configuration between them is morphing into a competitive structure 
from mutually complementary structure in the GVCs.103  South Korea has entered the global capitalist order 
and carved a niche for itself in a very competitive environment and then, from the 1990s onward, it has 
negotiated the globalization of investment and trade on its own terms, and has advanced its standing in the 
new order.  The question, for future studies, is whether the BRI would provide South Korea with equally 
malleable groundwork to continue to modify and transform its economy.  However, it is certain that the 
relatively co-operative economic link between China and South Korea will morph into competition.  
Further, China is less likely to be mindful of the rules of multilateralism, as it expands its markets. 
 
The BRI, in its present form, appears to be a blueprint to absorb a matrix of geographies of physical 
locations, finance, FDI and trade. It can, if fully realized, form a domain that may pose a competitive 
challenge to MNEs and GVCs that are placed in its periphery.  The primary difference between the South 
Korean business systems and those of China is that, in the former the top echelon of the economy is 
occupied by profit-dependent private enterprises, in contrast to China, where the dominators are the state-
owned-enterprises that are readily financed and supported with public funds.  These are entities that are 
treated as ‘going concerns’ with readily available Chinese state credit from the nation’s massive foreign 
exchange reserves.104  Clearly, the BRI, may then, contain a monopolistic region, with administrative 
hegemony, while enforcing competitive behaviour for the market actors of other nations. 
 
The relationship of the chaebols and the South Korean SMEs is not equitable but symbiotic.  Yet, the global 
economy is the pace-setter of their relationship.  The Chinese business systems, discussed above, have no 
such disadvantages, due to their clear dominance which is arguably going to be expanded via the BRI.  
Chaebols have distinct characteristics that are apparent as such that they are able maintain their management 
styles in their overseas ventures.105  In the case of the Chinese business systems, the overseas activities are 
a primary reflection of the national politics governing an economic system.  The growth factors behind the 
Chinese and South Korean models are different. The most important source of South Korean economic 
growth, for the 1960-2014 period, was annually continuous productivity growth, followed by human capital 
accumulation.106 The case of China is quite different as its present economic status is an outcome of the 
major Western economic powers’ willingness to accommodate and integrate it rapidly into the global 
finance and investment multilateralism, throughout the 1990s and 2000s, which is detailed elsewhere.107   
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103 Hyunju Kang (2018) ‘The Time-varying Impact of China’s Economic Rebalancing on Korea’s Exports to China’.  International Economic Journal.  
32(1): 31-42. 
104 Celal Bayari (2018) ‘Economy and Market in China’.  Academy of Taiwan Business Management Review.  14(1): 13-36. 
105 Jaehee Cho (2014) ‘Impacts of information-providers’ perceived cultural backgrounds on information-seeking behaviors’.   International 
Journal of Intercultural Relations.  4: 66–79 
106 Hyeok Jeong (2017) ‘Korea’s Growth Experience and Long Term Growth Model’.  World Bank Group.  Development Research Group 
Macroeconomics and Growth Team. 
107 Celal Bayari (2018) ‘Economy and Market in China’.  Academy of Taiwan Business Management Review.  14(1): 13-36. 
 14 
 
REFERENCES 
Abe, Makoto and Momoko Kawakami (1997) ‘A Distributive Comparison of Enterprise Size in Korea and 
Taiwan’.  The Developing Economies.  35(4): 382-400 
Aizenman, Joshua, Yothin Jinjarak and Huanhuan Zheng (2018) ‘Chinese outwards mercantilism’.  Journal 
of International Money and Finance.  86 (September): 31-49. 
AEI, American Enterprise Institute (2019) ‘Worldwide Chinese Investments & Construction (2005 - 2019)'.  
Available at: <http://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/>.  Accessed 27 August 2019. 
APEC (2014) Integrating SMEs into Global Value Chains.  APEC Policy Support Unit.  Issues Paper No 
6. 
Asia News Monitor (2020) ‘China: COVID-19 won't have long-term impact on BRI’.  2 April. 
Alvstam, Claes and Inge Ivarsson and Bent Petersen (2019) ‘Are multinationals and governments from 
emerging economies configuring global value chains in new ways?  International Journal of Emerging 
Markets.  15(1): 111-130. 
Bagshaw, Eryk and James Massola (2020) ‘China's post-pandemic shopping spree: how coronavirus 
strengthens the Belt and Road Initiative’.  The Sydney Morning Herald.  1 May. 
Bayari, Celal (2018) ‘Economy and Market in China’.  Academy of Taiwan Business Management Review.  
14(1): 13-36.  
Blank, Stephen (2018) ‘Korean Denuclearization in the context of earlier Proliferation and Disarmament 
negotiations’.  The Journal of East Asian Affairs.  32(2): 1-58. 
Cadestin, Charles Koen De Backer, Isabelle Desnoyers - James, Sébastien Miroudot, Ming Ye and Davide 
Rigo (2018) Multinational Enterprises and Global Value Chains: New Insights on the Trade- Investment 
Nexus.  Paris: OECD. 
Canuto, Otaviao (2019) ‘China’s Growth Rebalance with Downslide’.  Policy Center for the New South.  
PB 19 07. 
Chae, Yun-Hwan (2019a) ‘[Sustainable Future] Local production could be the key to global success’.  
Available at <http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com>.  Accessed 16 March 2020. 
Chae, Yun-Hwan (2019b) ‘FTC names 59 chaebol to 2019 watch list’.  Korea Joong Ang Daily.  15 May.   
Chai, Hongxia and Xiongwei Song (2013) ‘The adaptive state, understanding political reform in China’. 
Policy Studies. 34(1): 73-88. 
Chai, Sun-Ki and Mooweon Rhee (2010) ‘Confucian Capitalism and the Paradox of Closure and Structural 
Holes in East Asian Firms’.  Management and Organization Review.  6(1): 5-29. 
Chan, Lai Ha, Pak K. Lee and Gerald Chan (2008) ‘Rethinking Global Governance’. Contemporary 
Politics. 14(1): 3-19. 
Chang, Kiyoung and Choongkoo Lee (2018) ‘North Korea and the East Asian Security order’.  The Pacific 
Review.  31(2): 245-255. 
Cheong, Inkyo (2016) ‘Analysis of the FTA Negotiation between China and Korea’.  Asian Economic 
Papers. 15(3): 170-187. 
Chilcote, Christina Kim (2018) ‘Bridges of Ambition to North Korea’.  Critical Sociology.  44(3) 437-453. 
Cho, Jaehee (2014) ‘Impacts of information-providers’ perceived cultural backgrounds on information-
seeking behaviors’.   International Journal of Intercultural Relations.  4: 66–79. 
Choi, Du Sig, Paul Michell and Dayananda Palihawadana (2008) ‘Exploring the components of success for 
the Korean chaebol’.  Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing.  23(5): 311–322. 
Choi, Seok Hyeon and Pan Suk Kim (2015) ‘Failure and success in South Korea and Taiwan.  Philippine 
Political Science Journal. 36(1): 19-34. 
Choi, Youngmi (2018) ‘A middle power’s trade policy under U.S.-China FTA competition’.  Contemporary 
Politics.  24:2, 233-249. 
Chun, Hong-min Chun (2019) ‘CEO pay disparity, chaebol affiliations, and implied cost of equity capital’.  
Finance Research Letters.  31: 480–488. 
Dicken, Peter (1999) Global Shift.  Transforming the World Economy.  Third Edition.  London: PCP. 
Dirlik, Arif (1997) ‘Critical reflections on “Chinese capitalism” as paradigm’.  Identities Global Studies in 
Culture and Power.  3(3): 303-330. 
 15 
Dirlik, Arif (2004) ‘Beijing Consensus: Beijing Gongshi’.  Globalization and Autonomy Online 
Compendium.  Mimeo. 
Djankov, Simeon and Sean Miner (eds) (2016) ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Motives, Scope, and 
Challenges’.  Peterson Institute for International Economics.  March. 
Dollar, David (2015) ‘China’s Rise as a Regional and Global Power: The AIIB and the One Belt, One 
Road’.  Brookings Paper. 
Dollar, David (2019) ‘Executive summary’, pp. 1-8 in WTO (2019) WTO (2019) Global Value Chain 
Development Report 2019.  Geneva: World Trade Organization. 
Dooley, Michael, David Folkerts-Landau, and Peter Garber (2004) ‘The Revived Bretton Woods System’. 
NBER Working Paper 10332.  National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Doremus, Paul, William W. Keller, Louis W. Pauly, and Simon Reich (1999) The Myth of the Global 
Corporation.  NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Eun-jung, Kwon (2012) ‘Top ten chaebol now almost 80% of Korean economy’.  Available at 
<http://.english.hani.co.kr>.  Accessed 16 March 2020. 
Fortune (2019) Fortune 2000.  www.fortune.com. 
Goh, Jaimin, Wonwook Choi and Jungeun Cho (2016a) ‘Changes in chaebol firms’ overinvestment after 
the Asian financial crisis’.  Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics.  23(1): 75-111. 
Goh, Jaimin, Jaehong Lee and Jungeun Cho (2016b) ‘A New Relationship between Ownership’.  Asia-
Pacific Journal of Financial Studies.  45: 222-253. 
Gong, Xue (2019) ‘The Belt & Road Initiative and China’s influence in Southeast Asia’.  The Pacific 
Review.  32(4): 635-665. 
Ha, Yong-Chool and Wang Hwi Lee (2007) ‘The Politics of Economic Reform in South Korea’.  Asian 
Survey. 47(6): 894-914. 
Harrison, Ann, Marshall Meyer, Peichun Wang, Linda Zhao and Minyuan Zhao (2019) ‘Can a Tiger 
Change Its Stripes?’.  NBER Working Paper 25475.   
Heo, Kyoungsun (2018) Effects of Corporate Governance on the Performance of State-Owned Enterprises.  
World Bank Group.  Governance Global Practice. 
Huang, Xiaohong, Rezaul Kabir and Lingling Zhang (2018) ‘Government ownership and the capital 
structure of firms: Analysis of an institutional context from China’.  China Journal of Accounting 
Research.  11: 171–185. 
Hundt, David and Sooyoung Kim (2019) ‘Elite Opinion and the “Belt and Road” Debate in South Korea’.  
Pacific Affairs.  92(1): 27-48. 
Hwan Cha, Seong (2003) ‘Myth and Reality in the Discourse of Confucian Capitalism in Korea’.  Asian 
Survey.  43(3): 485-506. 
Hwang, Balbina Y. (2019) ‘Northeast Asian Perspectives on China’s Belt Road Initiative’.  East Asia.  
36:129–150. 
Jeong, Hyeok (2017) Korea’s Growth Experience and Long Term Growth Model.  World Bank Group.  
Development Research Group Macroeconomics and Growth Team. 
Jiang, Yang (2015) ‘Vulgarisation of Keynesianism in China's response to the global financial crisis’.  
Review of International Political Economy. 22(2): 360-390. 
Jones, David and Hanzhen Liu (2017) ‘Management of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment: “One Belt, One 
Road” across Eurasia to Africa and Europe Amidst Maritime Tensions in the South China Sea Region’.  
International Relations and Diplomacy.  5(8): 486-500. 
Joyez, Charlie (2019) Alignment of Multinational Firms along Global Value Chains.  GREDEG Working 
Papers Series.  No 2019 05. 
Jun, Yongwook and Dong-Soon Kim (2008) ‘Korean Chaebol’, pp: 25-53 in Kim, Young Chan, Kim Doo 
Jin, Young Jun Kim (eds) (2008) South Korea.  Oxford: Chandos Publishing. 
Jung, Seung-Ho and Byung-Yeon Kim (2018) ‘Trade Between North Korea and China’.  Emerging Markets 
Finance and Trade.  54(7): 1475-1489. 
Kang, Hyunju (2018) ‘The Time-varying Impact of China’s Economic Rebalancing on Korea’s Exports to 
China’.  International Economic Journal.  32(1): 31-42. 
Kenderdine, Tristan (2018) ‘Death of the East Asian Goose and the Rise of China’s Geoindustrial Policy’.  
Journal of Chinese Political Science.  23: 437-453. 
 16 
Kim, Byung-Kook and Hyug-Baeg Im (2001) Crony Capitalism in South Korea, Thailand and Taiwan. 
Journal of East Asian Studies. 1(1): 5-52. 
Kim, Chuk Kyo (2019) Economic Development of Korea.  Singapore: WSP. 
Kim, Eun Mee (2015) Korea’s Evolving Government Business Relationship.  United Nations University 
World Institute for Development Economics Research. 
Kim, Eun Mee, Pil Ho Kim and Jinkyung Kim (2013) ‘From development to development cooperation’.  
The Pacific Review.  26(3): 313-336. 
Kim, Hyejin (2018) ‘Transnational Korean Networks and Business in China’.  Europe-Asia Studies.  70(7): 
1143-1158. 
Kim, In Song, Helen V. Milner, Thomas Bernauer, Iain Osgood, Gabriele Spilker and Dustin Tingley  
(2019)  ‘Firms and Global Value Chains’.  International Studies Quarterly.  1–15. 
Kim, Jiyoung (2017) ‘Corporate financial structure of South Korea after Asian financial crisis’.  Economic 
Structures.  6(24): 2-14. 
Kim, Keunsoo (2013) ‘Chaebols and Their Effect on Economic Growth in South Korea’.  Korean Social 
Sciences Review.  3(2): 1-28. 
Kim, Kyung Mi and Hyeong-Ki Kwon (2017) ‘The State’s Role in Globalization’.  Politics & Society.  
45(4): 505–531. 
Kim, Soyon (2016) ’Global Capital, Business Groups and State Coordination’.  Social Studies.  11 (1): 145-
173. 
Kong, Tat Yan (2018) ‘China’s engagement-oriented strategy towards North Korea’.  The Pacific Review.  
31 (1): 76-95. 
Kwon, Hyeong‐ki and Kyung Mi Kim (2018) ‘Varieties of globalisation and national economy’.  Journal 
of International Development.  1-27. 
Lee, Hong Yung (2008) ‘A Comparative Study of Korean, Chinese, and Japanese Traditional Family and 
Contemporary Business Organizations’.  EAI Working Paper Series. 14. 
Lee, Hyuntai, Jangho Choi, Hyelin Choi, Yongsun Kim and Joonkoo Lee (2018) ‘China’s Manufacturing 
Development and Its Implications for Korea’.  World Economic Brief.  8(18): 1-5. 
Lee, Jong-Wha (2016) ‘Korea’s Economic Growth and Catch-up’.  China & World Economy.  24(5): 71-
97. 
Lee, Joonkoo, Jong-Cheol Kim and Jinho Lim (2016) ‘Globalization and Divergent Paths of Industrial 
Development’.  Journal of Contemporary Asia.  46(2): 222-246. 
Lee, Jungmin and Jai S. Mah (2018) ‘Korea’s Foreign Direct Investment in the Automotive Industry in 
China’.  China Report.  54(2):175-193 
Lee, Min-gyu and Yufan Hao (2018) ‘China’s Unsuccessful Charm Offensive’.  Journal of Contemporary 
China.  27(114): 867-886. 
Lee, Seung Hyok and Wooyeal Paik (2018) ‘Is South Korea Leaning Toward China’.  Pacific Focus.  33(2): 
237–259. 
Lee, Seong-hyon (2018) ‘The Shift of Security Environment in Northeast Asia’.  Journal for Peace and 
Nuclear Disarmament.  1(2): 352-362. 
Lee, Seungrae and Seung Jae Park (2016) ‘Global Production vs. Inventory Supply and Financial 
Performance’.  Management Science and Financial Engineering.  22(1): 21-26. 
Lee, Su-Yol and Robert D. Klassen (2008) ‘Drivers and Enablers that Foster Environmental Management 
Capabilities in Small and Medium-Sized Suppliers in Supply Chains’. Production and Operations 
Management.  17(6): 573-586. 
Lee, You-il and Kyung Tae Lee (2015) ‘Economic Nationalism and Globalization in South Korea’. Asian 
Perspective. 39: 125-151. 
Lim, Sung-hyun and Lee Eun-joo (2019) ‘Korea pledges $5 bn funding to groom local supply chain for 
chip industry’.  Available at <https://pulsenews.co.kr>.  Accessed 16 March 2020. 
Lim, Phillip Wonhyuk (2001) ‘The Evolution of Korea’s Development Paradigm’. ADB Institute Working 
Paper 21. 
Lim, Wonhyuk (2012) ‘Chaebol and Industrial Policy in Korea’.  Asian Economic Policy Review.  7: 69-
86. 
 17 
Lind, Jennifer and Daryl G. Press (2018) ‘Markets or Mercantilism’.  International Security.  42 (4): 170-
204. 
Liou, Chih shian (2017) ‘Varieties of State Capitalism across the Taiwan Strait’, pp. 117-132 in Dittmer 
Lowell (ed) Taiwan and China.  Oakland, California: University of California Press. 
Liu, Ruiming (2019) ‘Upstream Monopoly’, pp. 97-113 Ruiming Liu (ed) How State-owned Enterprises 
Drag on Economic Growth.  Berlin: Springer Verlag. 
Ministry of SMEs and Start-ups (2019) ‘Status of Korean SMEs’. Available at 
<https://www.mss.go.kr/site/eng/02/20202000000002019110610.jsp>.  Accessed 16 March 2019. 
Muhui Zhang (2018a) ‘Institutional Creation or Sovereign Extension’.  International Relations of the Asia-
Pacific.  18: 249-278. 
Noh, Yong-Hwan (2017) ‘Status of Korean SMEs and Policy Tasks for the Implementation of SME centred 
Economy’.  Korea Development Institute Journal of Economic Policy Conference.  December. 
OEC (2020a) ‘Economic Complexity Rankings’. The Observatory of Economic Complexity.  Available at 
<www.oec.com>. Accessed 4 March 2020. 
OEC (2020b) ‘South Korea’. The Observatory of Economic Complexity.  Available at <www.oec.com>. 
Accessed 4 March 2020. 
OEC (2020c) ‘China’. The Observatory of Economic Complexity.  Available at <www.oec.com>. 
Accessed 4 March 2020.  
OECD (2017a) Government at a Glance Chapter 2 Public Finance and Economics, Figure 2.48. 
Government investment as percentage of GDP, 2007, 2009, 2015 and 2016.  Available at 
<www.oecd.com>.  Accessed 16 March 2020. 
OECD (2017b) The Size and Sectoral Distribution of State-Owned Enterprises.  Paris: OECD Publishing. 
OECD (2018a) OECD Economic Surveys: Korea 2018.  Paris: OECD Publishing. 
OECD (2018b) Enhancing Dynamism in SME and Entrepreneurship in Korea.  Economics Department 
Working Papers No. 1510. 
OECD (2019) Multinational Enterprises in Domestic Value Chains.  OECD Science, Technology and 
Industry Policy Papers.  63.  Paris: OECD. 
Paik, Wooyeal (2020) ‘The politics of Chinese tourism in South Korea’. The Pacific Review.  33(2): 331-
355. 
Park, Ju-min (2019) ‘Supply chain pain’.  Available at <https://www.reuters.com>.  Accessed 16 March 
2020. 
Park, Seung-Rok and Ky-hyang Yuhn (2012) ‘Has the Korean chaebol model succeeded’.  Journal of 
Economic Studies.  39(2): 260-274. 
Rebol, Max (2010) ‘Why the Beijing Consensus is a Non-Consensus: Implications for Contemporary 
China-Africa Relations’.  Culture Mandala. 9(1): 7-20. 
Rinna, Anthony V.  (2018)  ‘Russia's Strategic Partnerships with China and South Korea’.  Asia Policy.  
13(3): 79-99. 
Rodrik, Dani (2010) ‘Is Chinese Mercantilism Good or Bad for Poor Countries’.  Project Syndicate. 
Sakuramoto, Carlos Luiz Carlos Di Serio and Alexandre de Vicente Bittara (2019) ‘Impact of supply chain 
on the competitiveness of the automotive industry’.  RAUSP Management Journal.  54(2): 206-225. 
Schroder, Marcel (2017) ‘Mercantilism and China's hunger for international reserves.’  China Economic 
Review.  42 (February):  15-33. 
Seng, Tan Aik (2017) ‘The Changing Arena of Power Contestation Between the State and Chaebols in 
South Korea.  Cornell International Affairs Review.  11(1). 
Shalal, Andrea (2020) ‘China open to talks with poor countries on coronavirus debt challenges’.  The Sydney 
Morning Herald.  9 April. 
Shin, Jae Yong, Jeong‐Hoon Hyun, Seungbin Oh and Hongsuk Yang (2016). ‘The effects of politically 
connected outside directors on firm performance’.  Corporate Governance International Review.  
26:23–44. 
Shin, Solee I. and  Lanu Kim (2019) ‘Chaebol and the Turn to Services.  Journal of Contemporary Asia.  
1-24. 
Sohn, Yul (2019) ‘South Korea under the United States–China rivalry’.  The Pacific Review.  32(6): 1019-
1040. 
 18 
Sung, Taeyoon and Doyeon Kim (2017) ‘How chaebol restructuring after the 1997 crisis has affected 
corporate decision and performance in Korea’.  China Economic Journal.  10(2): 147-161. 
Wahn, I-Liang (2018) ‘The state–consumer relationship and the instituting of consumer protection in East 
Asian societies’.  Journal of Consumer Culture.  19(1): 82-103. 
Wong, Audrye (2020) ‘Managing Small Allies Amidst Patron-Adversary Rapprochement’.  Asian Security.  
16(1): 107-126. 
Woo, Cheonsik Woo and Kwang-Eon Sul (2001) Industrial Upgrading of Korea.  Korea Development 
Institute. 
WTO (2020) ‘Trade in value-added and global value chains’.  Available at <www.wto.org>.  Accessed 3 
March 2020. 
Wuthnow, Joel (2012) ‘Chinese Perspectives on the Belt Road Initiative’.  INSS.  China Strategic 
Perspectives.  No 12. 
Xiaotong, Zhang and James Keith (2017) ‘From Wealth to Power: China's New Economic Statecraft’.  The 
Washington Quarterly. 40(1): 185-203. 
Yang, Florence (Wen-Ting) (2020) ‘Asymmetrical Interdependence and Sanction’.  Issues & Studies: A 
Social Science Quarterly on China, Taiwan, and East Asian Affairs.  55(4): 1-39. 
Yang, Jae-Jin (2017) The Political Economy of the Small Welfare State in South Korea.  Cambridge: CUP. 
Yeung, Henry Wai Chung (2014) ‘Governing the Market in a Globalising Era: Developmental states’.  
Review of International Political Economy. 21 (1): 70–101. 
Yu, Hong (2017) ‘China's Belt and Road Initiative and Its Implications for Southeast Asia’. Asia Policy. 
24: 117-122.  
Yun, Ji-Whan (2010) ‘The Myth of Confucian Capitalism in South Korea’.  Pacific Affairs.  83(2): 237-
229.   
Zhang, Muhui (2018b) ‘Proceeding in hardship’.  The Pacific Review.  31(1): 57-75. 
Zhang, Wanfa and Feng Sun (2012) ‘Resurrection through Adaptation’.  Journal of Comparative Asian 
Development. 11(2): 349-378. 
Zhu, Xiaodong (2012) ‘Understanding China’s Growth: Past, Present, and Future’.  Journal of Economic 
Perspectives.  26(4): 103–124. 
Ziegler, Charles E. and Rajan Menon (2014) ‘Russia, China, and the United States: Neomercantilism and 
Great-Power Energy Competition in Central Asia and the Caspian’. Strategic Studies Quarterly.  
Summer: 17-41. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHIC DETAILS 
The Journal of East Asian Affairs.  33(1): 89-122. 
ISSN 1010-1608.  Publication year: 2020.  July. 
국가안보전략연구원 
Download the published article from http://www.inss.re.kr/eng/eng.htm 
 
